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Abstract— In this paper, we define the power region as the
set of power allocations for K users such that everybody
meets a minimum signal-to-interference ratio (SIR). The SIR is
modeled in a multiuser CDMA system with fixed linear receiver
and signature sequences. We show that the power region is
convex in linear and logarithmic scale. It furthermore has a
componentwise minimal element. Power constraints are included
by the intersection with the set of all viable power adjustments.
In this framework, we aim at minimizing the total expended
power by minimizing a componentwise monotone functional. If
the feasible power region is nonempty, the minimum is attained.
Otherwise, as a solution to balance conflicting interests, we
suggest the projection of the minimum point in the power region
onto the set of viable power settings. Finally, with an appropriate
utility function, the problem of minimizing the total expended
power can be seen as finding the Nash bargaining solution, which
sheds light on power assignment from a game theoretic point of
view. Convexity and componentwise monotonicity are essential
prerequisites for this result.
I. INTRODUCTION
In interference limited wireless communication systems,
like code division multiple access (CDMA), mobile users
regulate transmission power to adapt to varying radio channel
and propagation conditions. The main purpose is to minimize
interference to other users while maintaining ones own data
rate at the lowest possible energy consumption. A number of
recent papers is dealing with the intertwining effect of power
adjustment and feasible data rates per user in wireless net-
works, hence defining a concept of overall network capacity,
see e.g., [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], and references therein.
A companion problem is the design of efficient power
control algorithms, preferably such that each user needs only
local information to update his power settings, but global
convergence is assured, see [6], [7], [8], [9].
Refined models also include stochastic fading effects of
the channel. The usual approach here is to minimize power
consumption subject to certain outage probability constraints.
Appropriate models, structural properties of the corresponding
feasible region, adequate power control algorithms and their
convergence are investigated in [6], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14].
In this paper, we investigate properties of the power region
and the existence of energy minimal power settings assuming
known channel information and fixed signature and linear
receiver sequences in CDMA systems. To summarize, the main
contributions are as follows.
In Section II we first define the power region for K users
as the set of power settings 0 ≤ p ∈ RK , such that in a
community of K users each user i encounters a signal-to-noise
ratio above a certain threshold γi. The power region is shown
to be convex in linear and logarithmic scale. It furthermore
contains a componentwise minimal element p∗ that can be
explicitly determined.
In Section III energy efficient power allocation is formalized
as minimizing a componentwise monotone function h over
the power region. In practice, however, power is limited. This
is included in our model by introducing the feasible power
region as the intersection with a convex and downward closed
set of viable power adjustments. In the case that there is no
feasible power allocation, we suggest the projection of p∗ onto
the viable power adjustments as a solution which balances
between conflicting interests of users. The solution can be
computed by applying cyclic projections onto simple affine
subsets.
Finally, by use of an appropriate utility function we show
in Section IV how optimal power allocation can be interpreted
as a cooperative game. It turns out that the Nash bargaining
solution coincides with the solution of the original power
minimization problem.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In a synchronous multiuser CDMA communication system
with K users and processing gain N let si ∈ RN , i =
1, . . . ,K , denote the N -dimensional signature sequence of
user i. Let Gij denote the fixed path gain from user j to
the assigned base station of user i. Usually Gij is subject to
slow fading effects which are assumed to be known to the
transmitter. Suppose the symbol of user i is decoded using
a linear receiver represented by some vector ci ∈ RN . The
signal-to-interference ratio of user i is then given as
SIRi(p) =
Gii(c
′
isi)
2pi∑
j 6=iGij(c
′
isj)
2pj + σ2(c′ici)
2
,
where σ2 denotes the variance of the additive Gaussian noise
and p = (p1, . . . , pK) the vector of transmit powers. In the
following we assume that the receiver sequences ci are fixed.
Summarizing the known channel and receiver effects into
Aij = Gij(c
′
isj)
2 we obtain the following SIRi of user i
SIRi(p) =
Aiipi∑
j 6=iAijpj + Ciiσ
2
.
with Cii = (c′ici)2. Now given quality-of-service requirements
γ1, . . . , γK for each user, we define the power region PSIR as
the set of power settings p ∈ RK such that each user i meets
his minimum SIR requirement γi, i.e.,
PSIR =
{
p ≥ 0 | SIRi(p) ≥ γi, i = 1, . . . ,K
}
. (1)
Here and in the following orderings ’<’ and ’≤’ between
vectors are always meant componentwise. Obviously it may
happen that not all requirements γi can be simultaneously
satisfied in which case PSIR is empty.
We now prove convexity and log-convexity of the power
region PSIR. The set PSIR is called log-convex, if for any
p(1), p(2) ∈ PSIR and any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 the point
p(α) = p(1)
α
p(2)
1−α
∈ PSIR,
where powers pα = (pα1 , . . . , pαK) are applied componentwise.
Taking logarithms componentwise gives
logp(α) = α logp(1) + (1 − α) logp(2)
which means that the set PSIR is convex in logarithmic scale.
Proposition 1 The power region PSIR is convex and log-
convex.
Proof: Consider the sets
Pi =
{
p | Aiipi − γi
∑
j 6=i
Aijpj ≥ γiCiiσ
2
}
, i = 1, . . . ,K,
which are closed convex affine halfspaces in RK . Obviously,
PSIR =
⋂K
i=1 Pi, and from Theorem C in section III of [15]
it follows that PSIR is a closed and convex polytope.
To prove log-convexity we show that
SIRi(p
(α)) ≥
(
SIRi(p
(1))
)α(
SIRi(p
(2))
)1−α
≥ γαi γ
1−α
i = γi
(2)
for all i = 1, . . . ,K , which entails p(α) ∈ PSIR. The first
inequality in (2) follows from Ho¨lder’s inequality since∑
j 6=i
Aijp
(1)
j
α
p
(2)
j
1−α
+ Ciiσ
2
≤
(∑
j 6=i
Aijp
(1)
j + Ciiσ
2
)α(∑
j 6=i
Aijp
(2)
j + Ciiσ
2
)1−α
,
hence yielding
SIRi
(
p(α)
)
=
Aiip
(1)
i
α
p
(2)
i
1−α
∑
j 6=iAijp
(1)
i
α
p
(2)
i
1−α
+ Ciiσ2
≥
( Aiip(1)i∑
j 6=iAijp
(1)
j + Ciiσ
2
)α( Aiip(2)i∑
j 6=iAijp
(2)
j + Ciiσ
2
)1−α
=
(
SIRi(p
(1))
)α(
SIRi(p
(2))
)1−α
for all i = 1, . . . ,K .
III. ENERGY EFFICIENT POWER ALLOCATION
For convenience of notation we quote the following result
from [3]. It deals with solutions of the equation
[I −A]x = c (3)
when A is a non-negative but not necessarily irreducible
matrix. The proof given in [3] is direct and self-contained,
and does not rely on the Perron-Frobenius theory. Let ρ(A)
denote the spectral radius of a square matrix A.
Proposition 2 Let A ∈ Rn×n be non-negative.
a) If there are x > 0 , c > 0 satisfying (3), then ρ(A) < 1.
b) If ρ(A) < 1, then I −A is non-singular and for every
c > 0, the unique solution x ∈ Rn of (3) is positive.
c) If ρ(A) < 1, then for every c ≥ 0, the unique solution
x ∈ Rn of (3) is non-negative.
d) If c > 0 and there exists y > 0 such that [I −A]y ≥ c,
then (3) has a unique solution x and 0 < x ≤ y.
The above is now applied to PSIR. The inequalities defining
(1) can be rewritten as a system of linear inequalities. For this
purpose write B = (bij)Ki,j=1, with
bij =
{
Aij/Aii, i 6= j,
0, i = j,
and τ = (τ1, . . . , τK)′, where τi = Ciiσ2/Aii. Then for every
p > 0 it holds that p ∈ PSIR if and only if
[I − diag(γ)B] p ≥ diag(γ)τ , (4)
where diag(γ) denotes the matrix with diagonal entries γi and
nondiagonal entries equal to zero.
If system (4) has a solution p > 0, then there is a unique
solution p∗ ≤ p satisfying
[I − diag(γ)B] p∗ = diag(γ)τ , (5)
as follows from Proposition 2. Moreover, for any given γ > 0,
the equation [I − diag(γ)B]p = diag(γ)τ has a positive
solution p if and only if the spectral radius ρ(diag(γ)B) < 1,
and in that case, the solution is unique. Denote it by pi(γ) =
(π1(γ), . . . , πK(γ))
′
. Thus
pi(γ) = [I − diag(γ)B]−1 diag(γ)τ (6)
with all components positive.
Summarizing our results so far, we have the following
Proposition 3 If PSIR 6= ∅, then there is a unique power
allocation p∗ = pi(γ) such that
SIRi(p
∗) = γi for all i = 1, . . . ,K and
p∗ ≤ p for all p ∈ PSIR.
Energy efficient power allocation can be formalized with
the help of some function h : RK+ → R as the following
optimization problem.
minimize h(p) over all p ∈ PSIR (7)
From Proposition 3 it is clear that for any componentwise
monotone function h the minimum is attained at π(γ) when-
ever PSIR 6= ∅. Examples of such functions h are
h(p) = ‖p‖q =
( K∑
i=1
|pi|
q
)1/q
,
the ℓq-norms, q ≥ 1, with the special case h(p) =
∑K
i=1 pi
for q = 1.
In practice, however, power is limited. Hence, mobiles may
select their power adjustment only from a bounded set Pmax,
say. In the following we assume that Pmax is convex and
closed under simultaneous decrease of power (see [3]), i.e.,
if p ∈ Pmax and 0 < q ≤ p, then q ∈ Pmax. (8)
Typical examples of structure (8) are individual power con-
straints
0 ≤ pi ≤ pi,max, i = 1, . . . ,K, (9)
or a limited total power budget as
K∑
i=1
pi ≤ pmax, pi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,K, (10)
or a combination hereof by intersecting both sets.
Under constraints (9) a relevant example of a component-
wise monotone function is
h(p) = −
K∏
i=1
(
epi,max − epi
) (11)
Its meaning will be clear from a game theoretic interpretation
of power allocation with certain utility functions in Section
IV.
Energy efficient feasible power allocation can now be writ-
ten as
minimize h(p) over all p ∈ PSIR ∩ Pmax,
where by assumption PSIR ∩Pmax is a convex subset of RK .
If PSIR ∩ Pmax 6= ∅ it follows from Proposition 2 and (8)
that pi(γ) from (6) is the optimal power allocation for any
componentwise monotone function h.
In the important case that PSIR 6= ∅ but PSIR ∩ Pmax = ∅
there exists no feasible power allocation to satisfy all SIR
requirements simultaneously. A solution pˆ ∈ Pmax which
balances the conflicting interests of users is the projection of
π(γ) onto the convex set Pmax,
pˆ = Proj
(
pi(γ) | Pmax
)
.
As follows from the classical projection theorem for Hilbert
spaces (see [16]), pˆ is unique. It represents the feasible power
U
0u
Fig. 1. A Nash bargaining problem
adjustment coming closest to the required but infeasible p∗ =
pi(γ).
For the above constraints (9) and (10) pˆ can be computed
by a convergent cyclic projection algorithm as investigated in
[17]. In this approach, starting with p∗, points are iteratively
projected onto convex sets whose intersection forms the set
where the projection onto is sought. Here only projections
onto affine halfspaces of the form H = {p | a′p ≤ β} are
needed. The general solution in this case is given by
Proj(p | H) = p−
1
a′a
(
a′p− β
)+
a.
By selecting a = ei (the i-th unit vector) and β = pi,max
we obtain the projection onto the set (9). The choice a =
(1, . . . , 1)′ and β = pmax yields the projection onto (10).
We proceed by interpreting optimal power allocation as a
cooperative game, and by embedding this approach into the
above framework.
IV. POWER ALLOCATION AS A COOPERATIVE GAME
We start by reviewing some basic concepts of cooperative
bargaining theory [18]. A K-person bargaining problem is a
pair (U,u0), where U ⊂ RK is a nonempty convex, closed
and upper bounded set and u0 = (u01, . . . , u0K) ∈ RK such
that u ≥ u0 componentwise for some u = (u1, . . . , uK) ∈ U,
see Fig. 1.
The elements of U are called outcomes and u0 is the
disagreement outcome. The interpretation of such a problem
is as follows. A community of K bargainers is faced with the
problem to negotiate for a fair point in the convex set U. If no
agreement can be achieved by the bargainers, the disagreement
utilities u01, . . . , u0K will be the outcome of the game. Let BK
denote the family of all K-person bargaining problems.
A bargaining solution is a function F : BK → RK such
that F (U,u0) ∈ U for all (U,u0) ∈ BK . Nash suggested a
solution that is based on four axioms, as given below.
(WPO) Weak Pareto optimality:
F : BK → RK is called weakly Pareto optimal, if for all
(U,u0) ∈ BK there exists no u ∈ U satisfying u > F (U,u0).
(SYM) Symmetry:
F : BK → RK is symmetric if Fi(U,u0) = Fj(U,u0)
for all (U,u0) ∈ BK that are symmetric with respect to a
subset J ⊆ {1, . . . ,K} for all i, j ∈ J (i.e., u0i = u0j and
(u1, u2, . . . , ui−1, uj , ui+1, . . . , uj−1, ui, uj+1, . . . . . . , uK) ∈
U for all i < j ∈ J,u ∈ U ).
(SCI) Scale covariance:
F : BK → RK is scale covariant if F (ϕ(U), ϕ(u0)) =
ϕ(F (U,u0)) for all ϕ : RK → RK , ϕ(u) = u¯ with u¯i =
aiui + bi, ai, bi ∈ R, ai > 0, i = 1, . . . ,K .
(IIA) Independence of irrelevant alternatives:
F : BK → RK is independent of irrelevant alternatives, if
F (U,u0) = F (U¯ , u¯0) for all (U,u0), (U¯ , u¯0) ∈ BK with
u0 = u¯0, U ⊆ U¯0 and F (U¯ , u¯0) ∈ U .
Remark. Weak Pareto optimality means that no bargainer can
gain over the solution outcome. Symmetry, scale covariance
and independence of irrelevant alternatives are the so called
axioms of fairness. The symmetry property states that the
solution does not depend on the specific label, i.e., users with
both the same initial points and objectives will obtain the same
performance. Scale covariance requires the solutions to be
covariant under positive affine transformations. Independence
of irrelevant alternatives demands that the solution outcome
does not change when the set of possible outcomes shrinks
but still contains the original solution.
These four axioms imply Pareto optimality which means
that it is impossible to increase any player’s utility without
decreasing another player’s utility.
The Nash bargaining solution is defined as follows.
Definition 4 A function N : BK → RK is said to be a Nash
bargaining solution (NBS) if
N(U,u0) = argmax
{ ∏
1≤j≤K
uj 6=u
0
j
(
uj − u
0
j
) ∣∣u ∈ U,u ≥ u0 },
whenever U\{u0} 6= ∅ and N(U,u0) = u0, otherwise.
The NBS aims at maximizing the product of the users’ gain
from cooperation, see Fig. 2 for the two dimensional case. In
addition it is uniquely characterized by the four axioms stated
above. The proof of the following theorem can be found in
[19].
Theorem 5 Let F : BK → RK be a bargaining solution.
Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(a) F = N.
(b) F satisfies WPO, SYM, SCI, IIA.
In the following we consider the feasible power region
P = PSIR ∩ Pmax
with Pmax = {p > 0 | pi ≤ pi,max}, as defined in (1) and
(9).
u1
u2
1 2
0
= const.
U
0(u −u  )(u −u  )1 2
1u*=(u*,u*)2
Fig. 2. The Nash Bargaining Solution
Our aim is to single out one element of the power region
P . There are many solution concepts to choose a reasonable
element of P , e.g. bargaining theory, proportional fairness,
max-min fairness. We choose bargaining theory and the NBS
in accordance with the above axioms.
Transmit power of each mobile station is bounded by pi,max.
Due to limited battery power each user aims at using the lowest
power possible. Hence we introduce a utility function fi for
each mobile station 1 ≤ i ≤ K as follows
fi : P → R, p 7→ e
pi,max − epi .
The task now is to find an element of the feasible power region
such that the utility of each player is maximized. This task
however is impossible to solve. As an alternative, we need to
find an element in the utility set f(P) that is superior to other
elements. The utility set is defined as the image of the utility
functions
f(P) = {epmax − ep | p ∈ P},
where ep = (ep1 , . . . , epK ) is defined componentwise and
epmax = (ep1,max , . . . , epK,max) accordingly.
Clearly we should choose a Pareto optimal element. The
question arises at which of the infinitely many Pareto optimal
points the system should be operated. From the perspective of
resource sharing, one of the natural criteria is the notion of
fairness. This, in general is a loose term and there are many
notions of fairness. One of the commonly used notions is that
of max-min fairness which penalizes large users. Max-min
fairness corresponds to a Pareto optimal point. However, it is
not easy to take into account that users might have different
requirements. A much more satisfactory approach is the use
of fairness from game theory as introduced above. Another
common solution concept of fairness is proportional fairness.
It can be shown that proportional fairness leads in fact to
the NBS. Therefor we confine ourselves to a game theoretic
approach here.
In our cooperative game, players are formed by mobile
stations, and they have to agree upon some element of the
utility set f(P). The bargaining set U is now obtained by
Uf(X)
Fig. 3. The extension U of the utility set f(P)
extending f(P) to
U =
{
u ∈ RK | ∃p ∈ P s.t. u ≤ f(p)
}
. (12)
As is shown in [20] the convexity of U follows since fi are
concave functions. Fig. 3 generically depicts the utility set
and its extension. Observe that the outcome of the cooperative
game lies in f(P), so that the enlargement to U is mainly of
technical reasons to assure convexity.
Moreover
u0 = −epmax (13)
represents the disagreement outcome, where each user has
to transmit with its maximum power if the mobile stations
fail to achieve an agreement. In summary, (U,u0) is a K-
person bargaining game. In the following the NBS of this game
is determined. It turns out that the NBS coincides with the
previously defined minimum power solution under function h
in (11). The proof follows easily from Definition 4.
Proposition 6 The unique NBS to the bargaining problem
(U,u0) defined in (12) and (13) is the solution to the following
optimization problem:
max
K∏
i=1
(epi,max − epi) (14)
such that
SIRi(p) ≥ γi,
pi ≥ 0,
pi,max − pi ≥ 0, 1 = 1, . . . ,K.
Problem (14) is equivalent to minimizing function (11)
subject to constraints (9). If the constraining set is nonempty,
the solution is given by p∗ = pi(γ) from (6), as is shown in
Section III.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper deals with the power control problem for a
multiuser CDMA channel. It is shown that the power region
is both convex and log-convex. It furthermore contains a
uniformly minimal element p∗, at which any componentwise
montone function attains its minimum. If there is no feasible
power allocation we suggest the point of minimum distance
to p∗ in the viable power region as a solution to the feasible
minimum power problem. This point can be easily computed
by a cyclic projection algorithm. The paper concludes with
showing that for an appropriate utility function the minimum
power problem with restricted power budget is obtained as the
Nash bargaining solution for an adaptively defined cooperative
game.
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